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Research into the characteristics and dynamics of 
the social structure has become a topical issue, and 
justifiably so, given the repercussions that far-reaching 
transformations in the international economic system 
have been having in recent times. The focus of attention 
has been on developments in the middle classes right 
across the world, although the research hypotheses this 
evolution entails can be seen to vary depending on the 
region or country concerned.
For one thing, the growth of middle-income sectors in 
a large group of Asian and Latin American countries has 
changed the face of global society and created an interest 
in comprehending the characteristics of this new social 
contingent (Kharas, 2010; Ravallion, 2010; Castellani 
and Parent, 2011; Franco, Hopenhayn and León, 2011). 
A variety of factors underlie these transformations, chief 
among them being the incorporation into the global market 
of the giant populations of China and India, with the 
consequent rise in global demand for commodities that 
has benefited the producer economies of Latin America. 
Per capita gross domestic product (gdp) growth has 
been such that it has impacted the monetary incomes 
of sectors historically situated in the poorer strata and 
has enlarged the middle-income population in both 
regions. Traditionally, much of the thinking about the 
importance of a vibrant middle class has been devoted 
to gauging its effects on economic development and the 
consolidation of democratic societies (Easterly, 2001; 
Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock, 2006).
Distributional trends in the more developed 
countries over the two closing decades of the last century 
foreshadowed some of the issues driving the concern with 
studying the social structure at the present time. Rising 
inequality, especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries, 
raised new questions about the depth of the changes 
that were occurring. In the United States, for example, 
the debate about whether there was an incipient trend 
towards the disappearance of the middle class began, quite 
vigorously, as early as the mid-1980s (Thurow, 1984; 
Rosenthal, 1985; Blackburn and Bloom, 1985; Bradbury, 
1986; Horrigan and Haugen, 1988). The subject remains 
topical in the central countries, with a strong impetus 
given to research into income polarization (Pressman, 
2007; Atkinson and Brandolini, 2011). In addition, the 
international crisis that began in 2007 and its effects 
on employment and income, especially in the northern 
hemisphere, have reactivated concern about worsening 
distribution and its social impact.
In this context, it is important to stress the relevance 
of analysing what has happened to the social structure in 
Argentina. For much of the last century, the country had 
a vigorous middle class, a high degree of upward social 
mobility and low levels of inequity, giving rise at an early 
stage (by the standards of Latin America generally) to 
high levels of social integration. This began to change 
in the mid-1970s with the onset of a stage marked by a 
persistent decline in the living standards of the middle- and 
lower-income sectors (with the exception of some short 
subperiods), culminating in late 2001 with unemployment 
of 25% and over half the population living in poverty. 
Since then, there has been a shift in tendency that has 
proved lasting. It is clearly of interest, then, to learn 
whether and how the remarkable increase in gdp in the 
first decade of this century led to a reorganization of the 
social structure and, if this happened, what its scale and 
particular characteristics were.
The aim of this article is to use different approaches 
and methodologies from economics and sociology 
to document the evolution of the social structure in 
Greater Buenos Aires1 from the mid-1970s until 2010. 
The purpose of the research was to provide a long-term 
overview of the size of the social classes and to evaluate 
the determinants of membership in each of them between 
the beginning and end of the period. The workings of 
the labour market were specifically addressed.
The article is organized into five sections. Section 
II sets out some of the theoretical and methodological 
background of most relevance to the aims of the research, 
the methods of analysis used in this study and the 
characteristics of the data source employed. Section III 
presents the results of the stratification criteria used and 
the distributional situation during the period under review, 
before going on to analyse the labour market. Section 
IV discusses the workings and broad characteristics of 
the labour market. Lastly, section V offers conclusions.
1   The country’s largest conurbation, containing about 30% of the 
total population and 40% of the total urban population.
I
Introduction
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1.  Background
The study of the systems organizing modern societies has 
always been inseparably linked to people’s employment 
relations, so that the classification systems developed have 
been based on certain job characteristics, the construction 
of occupational scales, or both. Sociological theory, 
whether in the variants that draw more on Marxist ideas 
(Wright, 1997 and 2009) or on Weberian thought (Erikson 
and Goldthorpe, 1992; Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2006), 
has routinely set out to conceptualize national social 
structures by examining the particular distribution of 
individuals in the world of work. Whether the emphasis 
is on membership of a social class (or group) or on the 
status (prestige) enjoyed by individuals as structuring 
elements of the social order and determinants of power 
relationships, people’s occupations were inevitably the 
empirical variable taken.2
While this sociological tradition remains the 
dominant conception in the specialist literature, it has 
been subjected to other analytical approaches because 
of the growing heterogeneity that now seems to 
characterize occupational strata or groups, something 
that severely limits the usefulness of these groupings 
in adequately explaining social conduct or behaviour 
such as voting decisions, consumption patterns and 
the spatial distribution of population. Underlying these 
observations is what has been called “the end of the 
wage-earning society” (Rosanvallon, 1995; Castel, 
1997). The crisis of the labour market as a mechanism 
for social integration in modern societies has not only 
excluded people from employment status (especially 
the traditional status of the full-time wage earner) but 
has increased the frequency of movement between the 
different social states (wage employment, non-wage 
employment, unemployment, inactivity) in a way that 
has made households’ social status and incomes more 
unstable. Against this background, emphasis has been 
laid on the undesirability of using discrete variables 
for social stratification, instead of which sliding scales 
taking account of individuals’ and households’ resource 
2   A review of the main contributions to the study of Latin American 
social structures can be found in Filgueira (2007).
(or asset) endowments have increasingly been used to 
determine their position in the social structure (Prandy, 
1990; Gershuny and Yee Kan, 2006; among others).
From the perspective of economic theory, conversely, 
the focus has been on monetary incomes as the independent 
variable for determining social groups and classes. 
The method traditionally used has been to define a 
priori the population size of the strata to be considered, 
before going on to evaluate the share of each group as 
thus defined in the mass of total incomes (Levy, 1988; 
Solimano, 2009). The lower class usually includes those 
in the bottom deciles of the income distribution, while 
the high class is composed of those at the top of the 
distribution. What is left over is defined as the middle 
class, which thus generally ranges from 40% to 60% 
of the population. By the same logic, thresholds have 
been set with reference to the poverty line, especially to 
define the high class (Atkinson, 2008; Eisenhauer, 2008). 
Whatever the rationale behind this kind of demarcation 
of social groups, clearly one of the main limitations of 
this approach is that it is not sensitive to changes in the 
size of social classes.
In view of this, a degree of consensus has formed 
around the alternative classification of the population 
into fixed-income strata or intervals. Thus, intertemporal 
comparison of population groups so defined will reflect 
changes in the size of their membership. Absolute limits 
have been used, especially for developing countries 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2008), but the predominant 
tendency has been to set an income interval whose upper 
and lower bounds are fixed with reference to a central 
tendency statistic for income distribution, usually the 
median (Thurow, 1987; Birdsall, Graham and Pettinato, 
2000; Foster and Wolfson, 2010). Sometimes the two 
approaches have been combined, with an absolute lower 
bound and a relative upper bound being taken (Birdsall, 
2010). Although the main advantage of this approach 
is its sensitivity when it comes to computing increases 
or decreases in the size of social groups, it is subject to 
certain caveats, since such changes will be partly a result 
of the boundaries of whatever interval has been chosen.
Meanwhile, the question of what has been happening 
to the middle class has provided the motivation for the 
development of a family of distribution indicators based 
on the concept of polarization (Esteban and Ray, 1994; 
II
methodology
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Duclos, Esteban and Ray, 2004; Foster and Wolfson, 
2010). The central idea is that income polarization 
occurs as the result of two forces: identification with 
or closeness to the group belonged to, and alienation or 
differentiation vis-à-vis others. By contrast with the two 
previous approaches, the income bounds determining 
membership of each group, and the number of members, 
will vary over time. The result is a synthetic indicator that 
can be used to quantify the degree to which the middle 
part of the income distribution is shrinking or expanding.
In summary, sociological studies of social structure 
and those conducted from an economic perspective 
are based on different methodological traditions, but 
are closely related. In general, a particular ranking 
based on individuals’ occupational characteristics or 
employment relations usually ties in closely with the 
current distributional situation in society. Indeed, it is 
routine to validate whatever stratification systems are 
chosen by their explanatory power vis-à-vis income 
dispersion. The two approaches are thus complementary, 
and their combined contributions seems to be increasingly 
necessary to a better understanding of the evolving 
physiognomy of modern societies. This article makes 
use of five indicators (three derived from economics 
and two more closely aligned with the sociological 
outlook), detailed in the following subsection, with a 
view to making a contribution in this area.
2. methods and data sources
The study made use of the three economic approaches 
just mentioned (strata fixed by the number of members, 
income interval relative to the median and synthetic 
polarization indicator) for the explicit purpose of 
ascertaining what they can bring to an understanding of 
changes in the social structure of Argentina.
People were divided into social classes by their 
position in the income distribution as follows: low 
class (deciles 1 and 2), middle class (deciles 3 to 8) and 
high class (deciles 9 and 10). The interval defining the 
middle class relative to median income was 0.75 to 1.5. 
Those below 0.75 and over 1.5 were placed in the low 
and high classes, respectively. Lastly, the polarization 
index employed was the one proposed by Foster and 
Wolfson (2010):
(T−G)μ/m
where μ and m are average and median per capita family 
income respectively, G is the Gini coefficient and T is 
the ratio between the average distance from the median 
of those above it and those below it. Given that (T-G) is 
equal to the Gini coefficient between the upper and lower 
halves of the distribution, minus weighted intragroup 
inequality, it follows that the greater the inequality 
between the two groups (upper and lower halves), the 
higher both inequality and polarization will tend to be. 
Conversely, greater intragroup inequality (keeping a fixed 
distance between those above and below the median) 
means higher inequality but lower polarization.
This was complemented by a further two criteria 
for demarcating social groups based, respectively, on 
individuals’ educational attainments and occupational 
status. Education has historically proved to be one of 
the main mechanisms for upward social movement and 
remains a powerful predictor of incomes. Consequently, 
it is relevant to compare changes in the distributional 
structure with alterations in the educational level of the 
population. To this end, three classes were constructed 
by the highest educational level attained: a low class (up 
to complete primary), a middle class (up to complete 
secondary) and a high class (incomplete or complete 
higher education).
As regards the second complementary criterion, 
occupational status, its relevance derives, as noted in the 
previous subsection, from the postulates of the sociological 
tradition of social class analysis. In addition, emphasis 
has increasingly been laid on the importance of the 
“employment stability” dimension as one of the most 
consistent determinants of people’s position in the social 
structure (Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2006). The research 
used a combination of the idea of informal employment 
and educational level. This choice was based precisely on 
the way these tied in with employment instability. The 
idea of informal working serves to characterize a certain 
specificity of labour markets in developing countries.3 
In the absence of general social protection mechanisms 
in these economies, informal (low-productivity) jobs 
are usually the method whereby a quite substantial 
proportion of people earn their living. Thus, informality 
is associated with unstable employment paths involving 
high turnover between economic activity (employment 
and unemployment) and inactivity. Furthermore, informal 
workers’ incomes are different to those of formal workers, 
being lower. This earnings penalty, which implies a 
segmented labour market, may result in membership 
of a particular social class.
3   The original perspective was provided by the International Labour 
Organization in the early 1970s (ilo, 1972) and has recently been 
updated (Hussmanns, 2004).
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With the categorization used, people can be 
classified into the economically active and inactive, with 
the former being further subdivided into the employed 
and the unemployed. The grouping arrived at was as 
follows: the low class (employees not registered with 
the social security system,4 domestic service workers, 
the unemployed, the inactive and, where appropriate, 
beneficiaries of job creation schemes),5 the middle class 
(own-account workers with up to incomplete university 
education and registered workers of a similar educational 
level) and the high class (employers, professional own-
account workers and registered employees with complete 
higher education). To focus attention on households with 
a greater dependence on the labour market, the universe 
of analysis was composed of household heads aged 
between 30 and 59, a central age range encompassing 
those who can be expected to be economically active.
4   Under Argentine law, wage employment is understood as an 
open-ended working relationship that does not require any specific 
contract to be signed between employer and worker. Although there 
are exceptions to this general rule, they have to be duly justified. 
Consequently, the employees who enjoy most stability are those in 
jobs registered by their employers with the social security system. 
Employees in unregistered jobs lack the protection provided by 
national employment contract law, some of whose sections provide 
for protection against dismissal, union representation and coverage 
by collective labour agreements.
5  Various job creation schemes have been implemented since 2001, 
with participants providing labour in return for benefits.
The statistical data source used was the Permanent 
Household Survey (eph) prepared by the National Institute 
of Statistics and Censuses (indec). The eph is conducted 
in the main cities of the country and covers about 70% of 
the total urban population. Its geographical coverage has 
been expanding since 1974, the year it began. Because 
the present study analyses events since that year, only 
information from Greater Buenos Aires could be used. 
From 1974 to 2003, the eph was a non-continuous 
survey carried out twice a year, in May and October. It 
underwent a major change in the latter year; in terms 
of fieldwork, it became a continuous survey producing 
quarterly estimates for some variables and half-yearly 
ones for others. In addition, changes were made to the 
questionnaire that restricted data comparability for certain 
categories of analysis. It is possible to analyse changes 
over time, however, as there is a period that is common, 
or might reasonably be considered common, to both 
survey methods: the second quarter of 2003. The last non-
continuous survey round was held in May. The decision 
was taken not to carry out the adjustment for this article, 
however, as correcting the estimates from 2003 onward 
by the application of a “splicing coefficient” entails a 
reduction of some 7% to 8% in the estimates, which does 
not alter the essential results. Furthermore, there are other 
methodological issues with this variant.
The income variables to be used were per capita 
family income and monthly earnings from the main 
occupation.
III
distribution and the social structure
1. the distributional situation and income polarization
The evolution of inequality in income distribution over the 
past three and a half decades took the form of an inverted 
U.6 There was a marked distributional deterioration during 
the period from 1974 to 2001, with the Gini coefficient 
rising by about 50% between the two years, from 0.353 
to 0.531 (see table 1). Following the convertibility crisis 
6   It should be stressed that these developments bear no resemblance 
whatsoever to Kuznets’ thesis that income distribution tends to be less 
equitable in the early stages of growth and only later becomes more 
equal. Argentina is an example of the opposite: greater/lower output 
has usually been accompanied by lower/greater inequity.
of late 2001 and the subsequent drop of about 30% in real 
incomes because of the devaluation implemented in early 
2002, a vigorous process of distributional improvement 
began in 2003, with the Gini index falling by somewhat 
over 20%, from 0.537 to 0.431. Nonetheless, the degree 
of inequity was still higher in 2010 than it had been in 
1974.7 A similar situation of deteriorating distribution 
during the last quarter of the twentieth century and 
subsequent progress towards equity can be seen in the 
evolution of the ratio between average and median 
incomes (see table 1).
7   Regarding the potential comparability of data, see the “Methods 
and data source” subsection. 
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TABLE 1
distribution indicatorsa in Greater Buenos aires, 1974-2010
Oct-1974 Oct-1980 Oct-1986 Oct-1991 Oct-1996 Oct-2001 Q4-2003 Q4-2006 Q4-2010
Gini coefficient 0.353 0.394 0.423 0.463 0.495 0.531 0.537 0.484 0.431
Polarization index (Foster and 
Wolfson)
0.638 0.793 0.913 1.098 1.271 1.427 1.411 1.120 1.010
Real median per capita family 
income (1974=1)
1.000 0.867 0.707 0.479 0.410 0.419 0.356 0.509 (0.62-0.97)b
Mean/median 1.206 1.266 1.390 1.561 1.583 1.661 1.655 1.516 1.388
Income share (percentages)
Quintile 1 6.7 5.8 5.2 4.9 3.6 2.6 2.8 3.9 4.7
Quintile 2 11.8 10.8 10.0 9.2 8.2 6.9 7.2 8.2 9.7
Quintile 3 16.6 15.3 14.8 13.4 13.1 12.0 12.1 13.4 14.8
Quintile 4 22.8 22.6 21.9 20.9 21.1 21.0 20.8 21.7 22.6
Quintile 5 42.2 45.5 48.1 51.6 54.0 57.5 57.1 52.8 48.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Population falling within per capita family income bands relative to the median (percentages)
<40 5.6 9.2 9.7 9.2 15.5 19.2 19.9 16.1 14.4
40 to 50 5.1 6.4 6.5 5.8 6.8 6.6 6.6 7.9 7.1
50 to 60 4.8 7.3 6.7 6.9 5.5 6.6 5.7 7.7 6.4
60 to 75 12.6 10.2 9.3 10.0 9.5 7.1 10.0 8.5 10.7
75 to 100 16.8 15.4 16.6 18.4 12.9 11.2 11.0 12.8 14.4
100 to 125 16.1 12.6 10.1 9.2 10.0 7.8 8.2 9.3 10.5
125 to 150 9.1 10.0 10.1 8.6 7.3 7.1 6.6 7.7 8.5
150 to 200 13.8 11.1 12.2 12.2 10.5 9.8 10.3 9.7 11.8
200 to 300 10.8 11.0 10.3 9.7 10.5 10.2 10.7 10.8 9.1
>300 5.4 7.0 8.5 10.0 11.6 14.4 11.0 9.6 7.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Income shares of the groups defined in the panel above (percentages)
<40 0.9 1.9 1.7 1.6 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.8
40 to 50 1.7 2.1 2.1 1.6 2.0 1.8 1.9 2.5 2.5
50 to 60 2.0 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.0 2.2 2.0 3.0 2.7
60 to 75 6.3 5.2 4.4 4.3 4.1 2.9 4.3 4.0 5.5
75 to 100 11.1 10.0 10.3 10.5 7.4 5.9 6.3 7.8 9.7
100 to 125 13.9 10.5 8.0 6.7 7.2 5.2 6.0 7.4 9.2
125 to 150 9.6 10.2 9.6 7.6 6.5 5.8 5.9 7.4 9.0
150 to 200 17.8 14.3 14.8 13.7 11.7 10.3 11.6 11.9 15.9
200 to 300 19.2 19.7 17.7 15.5 16.7 15.0 16.8 18.4 17.1
>300 17.4 23.1 28.8 36.1 40.1 48.5 42.6 34.9 25.7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Permanent Household Survey (eph).
Note: The eph data gathering methodology was altered in 2003. Various methods of splicing the data series from before and after that date can be 
used to deal with this. However, correcting the estimates from 2003 onward, when a “splicing coefficient” is applied, entails an adjustment of some 
7% or 8%. As it does not alter the primary results, the decision was taken to dispense with this variant, with which there are methodological issues.
a  All distribution estimates were based on per capita family income.
b  Alterations in the method of measuring the consumer price index in 2007 mean that values prior and subsequent to that year are not directly 
comparable. For this reason, two estimates were made, and from these it can be concluded that the value of the concept of interest falls within 
the interval reported.
Polarization, which, as discussed earlier, is related to 
inequality but is not identical with it, followed a similar 
pattern. It will be recalled that this phenomenon reflects 
an accentuation of the extremes (top and bottom) of the 
income distribution, so that greater polarization directly 
squeezes those in the middle part of the distribution. From 
the mid-1970s until the early twenty-first century, there 
was a pronounced and steady increase in polarization, 
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outstripping even the distributional deterioration already 
discussed (see table 1). Even by 1996, the degree of 
polarization in the income distribution was twice what it 
had been in 1974, while the inequity coefficient declined 
by about 40% over the same period. The trend of this 
indicator went clearly into reverse from 2003 and for the 
rest of the decade. As with the Gini coefficient, however, 
this reversal from 2003 was not enough to make up for 
the cumulative deterioration of the earlier phase.
The discrepancy between the change in the Gini 
coefficient and the situation revealed by analysis of the 
degree of income polarization suggests that there were 
substantial changes in the social structure. This approach 
thus provides a more sensitive way of capturing the 
consolidation of groups composed of individuals sharing 
common attributes, i.e., groups that are reasonably 
homogeneous in their composition. Table 1 provides 
further information to justify this claim, and it can be 
appreciated that the increase in income concentration and 
polarization occurred simultaneously with a cumulative 
drop in real per capita incomes totalling almost 60% 
between 1974 and 2001. A further piece of information 
reflecting the combined effects of the drop in real 
household incomes and the worsening distribution is that 
the proportion of households with incomes below 40% 
of the average per capita family income value virtually 
quadrupled to 19% between 1974 and 2001, while the 
proportion with incomes exceeding that value by over 
300% almost tripled from 5.4% to 14.4%. Again, when 
the share of income appropriated by each income stratum 
is considered, it can be concluded that the bulk of the 
poor ended that quarter century even poorer, while the 
rich (whose number also increased) appropriated more 
resources (see the last panel of table 1). These trends 
were reversed in the period of expansion from 2003 to 
2010, albeit to varying degrees in the different social 
groups. The following section addresses this.
2. changes in the social structure
It will be recalled that the study employed five criteria to 
measure these social groups: (i) groups with a numerically 
constant membership defined by their position in the 
income distribution; (ii) classes delimited by the position 
of income recipients relative to a central tendency statistic 
for income distribution; (iii) a derivation of the first two, 
taking the income share of social groups defined by a 
fixed income interval; (iv) taking the education level 
of the household head; and (v) taking the employment 
position of household heads of working age.
(i)  Delimitation by income quantiles
Using this measurement criterion, it was found that 
the low and middle classes (in that order) experienced a 
substantial drop in their income shares in the final quarter 
of the last century, whereas in the seven-year period 
beginning in 2003 they were able to recover much of that 
share. The low class, comprising the poorest 20% of the 
population, underwent a dramatic reduction in income 
share of about 60% between 1974 and 2001 (from 6.7% 
to 2.6%, see table 2). The middle class, comprising the 
60% of the population belonging to the second, third 
and fourth quintiles, also saw its income share decline, 
albeit to the much lesser extent of just over 20% (from 
51.1% to 39.9%). Consequently, and strikingly, the 
income distribution share of the high class, comprising 
the wealthiest 20%, rose by some 35% (from 42.2% to 
57.5%). These trends were reversed over the following 
stage, from 2003 to 2010, although not to the extent of 
restoring the situation of the mid-1970s. The recovery 
was greatest for the low class. If table 2 is examined 
again, it can be seen that the share of the lower stratum 
increased by about 70% (from 2.8% to 4.7%), while that 
of the middle swathe rose by some 18% (from 40.1% 
to 47.1%). The share of resources going to the high 
class accordingly fell by some 16% (from 57.1% to 
48.2%). A review of the figures shows that the strength 
and persistence of this process of resource reallocation 
was unparalleled in Argentine economic history since 
at least the mid-1970s.
Between the beginning and end of the extended 
period (1974 to 2010), however, the total income 
share of the members of the high class increased, so 
that by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first 
century they were wealthier than they had been 36 
years earlier. Similarly, the poorest still had less in 
the way of monetary resources than in 1974. Lastly, 
the middle class had not been restored to its income 
share of that period either, although of all three classes 
it came closest.
It is worth noting that these adjustments between 
social classes closely track the Gini coefficient (whose 
characteristic is that it is more sensitive to changes in 
the middle part of the distribution), but diverge more 
from the path of income polarization, which, it will be 
recalled, was 60% greater in 2010 than it had been in 
1974. In other words, the distributional improvement in 
the first decade of the twenty-first century took the form 
of a marked recovery of incomes in the middle sector 
and, albeit to a lesser degree, in the low class.
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TABLE 2
the social structure in Greater Buenos aires, 1974-2010
(Various approaches)
Oct-1974 Oct-1980 Oct-1986 Oct-1991 Oct-1996 Oct-2001 Q4-2003 Q4-2006 Q4-2010
Income share (by income quantile of which member)
Low class (bottom 20%) 6.7 5.8 5.2 4.9 3.6 2.6 2.8 3.9 4.7
Middle class (middle 60%) 51.1 48.9 46.7 43.5 42.4 39.9 40.1 43.3 47.1
High class (top 20%) 42.2 45.4 48.1 51.6 54.0 57.5 57.1 52.8 48.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
By position in the income distribution (relative to the median)
Low class: below 75% 28.1 33.0 32.2 32.0 37.3 39.5 42.2 40.1 38.5
Middle class: between 75% and 150% 42.0 37.9 36.8 36.2 30.2 26.1 25.8 29.8 33.4
High class: over 150% 29.9 29.1 31.0 31.8 32.6 34.5 32.0 30.1 28.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Income share (of groups defined by position in the income distribution relative to the median)
Low class: below 75% 11.0 12.2 10.8 9.9 10.4 9.2 11.0 12.2 13.5
Middle class: between 75% and 150% 34.6 30.7 27.9 24.7 21.1 16.9 18.1 22.6 27.9
High class: over 150% 54.5 57.1 61.3 65.3 68.5 73.9 70.9 65.2 58.6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
By educational level of household head 
Low class: up to complete primary 64.1 62.5 51.2 48.2 42.8 40.0 37.7 34.7 30.5
Middle class: secondary (incomplete 
and complete)
26.2 25.5 33.0 34.4 35.5 35.7 35.6 37.8 37.1
High class: higher (complete and 
incomplete)
9.7 12.0 15.8 17.5 21.7 24.3 26.6 27.5 32.3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
By instability of employment (household heads aged between 30 and 59)
Low class: employees, unstable 19.0 20.7 20.9 25.9 34.4 37.6 37.1 34.6 30.1
Middle class: stable, medium grade 70.1 67.1 65.4 59.4 50.1 46.3 45.9 47.0 49.5
High class: stable, higher grade 10.9 12.2 13.8 14.6 15.5 16.1 17.1 18.4 20.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Permanent Household Survey (eph).
(ii)  Social classes by income interval relative to 
the median
When social classes are defined by an income gap 
from the median,8 alterations in their size over the period 
studied reveal a situation that, while consistent overall 
with the two phases that have been identified, 1974 to 
2001 and 2003 to 2010, provides additional information 
that is helpful in categorizing the kind of transformation 
undergone by the social structure of Argentina.
8   It will be recalled that the delimitation used in this study was <75; 
75 to 150; and >150.
Using this demarcation, it can be seen that the size 
of the low class increased by about 40% between 1974 
and 2001, from 28.1% of the population to 39.5% (see 
table 2). In other words, households that were formerly 
in the higher social strata, and particularly the middle 
ones, entered this social class. Indeed, one peculiarity 
of this process of downward social mobility in the 
income distribution was that it was accompanied by a 
sharp contraction of the middle class, which shrank by 
somewhat over 35% (from 42.0% to 26.1% of the total). 
This figure is a stark reflection of the dissolution of the 
middle class in Argentine society already referred to by 
numerous earlier studies. It should be stressed that the 
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thinning of the middle strata mainly took place during 
the last decade of the twentieth century. The middle class 
had accounted for 37.9% of the population in 1980; by 
1991, the figure was 36.2%.
Not all the reduction in the middle class went to 
swell the lowest stratum of society. In fact, the middle 
stratum of the population shrank by more than the low 
class grew, and the size of the high class increased 
accordingly. Thus, this social group expanded by 46%, 
with its share of the population rising from 29.9% in 
1974 to 34.5% in 2001. Taken together, this evidence 
illustrates the kind of income polarization experienced in 
Argentina, characterized by rising shares of the population 
in the social groups at the top and bottom of the income 
distribution. Similar processes have been documented 
for other economies, examples being the United States 
and the United Kingdom in the period covering the 
1980s and the 1990s (Jenkins, 1995; Burkhauser and 
others, 1999).
At this point, a methodological observation should be 
made to put the findings just discussed into perspective. 
The approach used here to demarcate the three social 
classes is distributional, and consequently refers to the 
position occupied by earners in the per capita family 
income classification. It says nothing, on the other hand, 
about whether needs are being met or about the level of 
consumption these relative positions entail for those in 
them. Thus, growth or contraction in the membership of 
the lower, middle and high classes has coincided with 
changes in the absolute poverty or wealth of each of 
them. When this information is incorporated, it needs 
to be appreciated that the increase in the size of the low 
class was also accompanied by a decline in this group’s 
living standards, as measured by the purchasing power 
of incomes (see table 1).
Partly counteracting this process, in the phase of 
improving distribution between 2003 and 2010 the low 
class shrank by about 10%, from 42.2% to 38.5% of the 
total. The greatest change, though, was in the middle 
layers of society, whose membership increased by 30% 
from 25.8% of the population in 2003 to 33.4% in 2010. 
Consequently, the high class shrank by about 15%, from 
32.0% to 28.1%, between the beginning and end of this 
seven-year period (see table 2).
The end result of developments in the social classes 
as variable units supports a view of Argentine society as 
being still affected by a high degree of social segmentation, 
something that is also consistent with the income 
polarization results. The growth in the middle class was 
a remarkable development, however, as virtually 8% of 
the population entered its ranks, with half (4 percentage 
points) having experienced what must be considered 
upward mobility (from the low class) while as many 
again came from the top segment. The latter movement 
seems to have been due to the changing distribution in 
the period together with the rising purchasing power 
of incomes, as the median per capita family income 
increased by 43% in real terms between 2003 and 2006.
As a corollary of the trends documented for the 
three main social classes, after some four decades the 
high class ended up at virtually the same level, while 
the share of the middle class was down by 9 percentage 
points, from 42.0% to 33.4%, and the low class had 
gained the same amount, with its share rising from about 
28.1% to 38.5%.
(iii)  The income shares of the social classes as 
defined above
The time has now come to introduce the results 
of the third measurement approach, which, as already 
noted, can be used to gauge income appropriation by the 
social groups, defined on this occasion by taking variable 
boundaries. In this case, the distances from the median 
income settled upon to demarcate the social classes in 
(ii) will be retained and the income appropriated by 
each will be assessed.
It can be established that in the subperiod from 1974 
to 2001, the income share of the low class (whose size 
increased) fell dramatically, by some 35% (see table 2). 
To put it differently, not only did the membership of the 
most disadvantaged group increase, but those in it received 
a smaller share of income as a class, meaning that in per 
capita terms they were poorer than they had been 25 
years before. The middle class, which contracted greatly, 
was also affected by a sharp reduction (of over 50%) in 
its income share. Indeed, this shrank by more than that 
class’s membership, confirming that, as happened with 
the members of the low class, those of the middle class 
had lower incomes on average in 2001 than in 1974. Not 
only was there downward mobility in the period, but those 
who succeeded in remaining within the middle stratum 
lost income. Only the high class was able to achieve 
the virtuous double of increasing its membership while 
increasing its income share by even more—some 50%.
In the following period, 2003 to 2010, the situation 
was reversed, albeit only in part, and followed the pattern 
already discussed. The improvement was greatest for the 
middle class, whose income share grew by about 50%, 
and somewhat lesser for the lowest class, with a figure 
of about 23%. The income share of the high class, on 
the other hand, fell by 16%, which was slightly greater 
than the decline in its membership over the same period. 
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This provides important evidence that, by contrast with 
earlier stages, those remaining in the best-off sector of 
society experienced a reduction in the income available 
to them as a class.
Between the beginning and end of the extended 
period of almost four decades starting in 1974, the 
situation was still far from the level achieved in 1974. 
By late 2010, the high class had a larger income share 
than in the mid-1970s. The low class had not recovered 
the share of resources available to it then, while the 
middle class was in deficit by about 20%.
(iv)  The educational level of household heads
As was to be expected, the educational level 
of household heads improved steadily and indeed 
substantially over the whole period. Whereas in 1974 about 
two in every three household heads had complete basic 
schooling or less, having never even started secondary 
school, by 2010 this group accounted for only 30.5% 
of the total (see table 2). Similarly, the number who had 
commenced higher education more than tripled between 
1974 and 2010. Taken together with the social structure 
just described, these developments suggest a growing 
mismatch between people’s educational attainment 
and their position in the social structure. This gap can 
be seen both in the trends of the different indicators 
of distribution and in those of occupational instability 
(see point (v) below). In other words, the shrinking 
of the middle class and the swelling of the low class 
during the 1974-2001 period, and the reversal of both 
processes between 2003 and 2010, took place in a context 
of sustained improvement in the educational level of 
the population. This characteristic, the devaluation of 
educational credentials, seems to have become a rather 
particular feature of the path followed by Argentine 
society. By contrast with what had happened in the 
past, educational attainment did not fully play its role 
in protecting incomes and employment quality during 
phases of deteriorating economic and social conditions. 
Its capacity for restoring people to similar positions in 
the social structure during upturns was also reduced.
(v)  The employment position of household heads 
in mid-life
Some 70% of the population live in households 
whose heads are aged between 30 and 59. In addition, 
these household members provide about 70% of total 
earnings (see table 4). These two facts warrant a closer 
look at their participation in economic activity.
The evolution of the social structure thus demarcated 
very closely matches the first three approaches used. The 
proportion of households whose heads were working in 
unstable occupations practically doubled between 1974 
and 2001, while the intermediate segment of families 
with heads in stable jobs fell by about 25% (see table 
2). As a result of these two developments, the group 
of households with heads in stable higher-grade work 
increased its share from 10.9% to 16.1%. The evolution 
of income distribution (increased concentration) and 
growing polarization (the shrinking of the middle class) 
clearly have a connection with the rising instability of 
employment among household heads. It can also be seen 
that in the seven-year period beginning in 2003, improved 
distribution, reduced polarization and the expansion of 
the middle class were accompanied by an increase in 
the instability of household heads’ occupations.
IV
the workings of the labour market 9
9 
1.  General characteristics
There is a great deal of evidence that the shifting workings 
of the labour market gave rise to the changes in the social 
structure that have been discussed. Between 1974 and 
2001, unemployment and informal working rose sharply, 
while the employment rate fell (see table 3). Again, 
in the 2003-2010 period, both open unemployment 
and informality declined while the employment rate 
increased substantially.
It is now time for a more detailed analysis, focusing 
on the economic participation of household heads.10 
9  The references to social classes in what follows are based on the 
stratification carried out using criterion (ii): social classes by income 
interval relative to the median.
10   It has already been mentioned that the occupational characteristics 
of household heads belonging to each of the three social classes 
identified provide the information needed to assess the deeper causes 
of changes in the social structure. Households’ monetary income 
derives essentially from the work of their members, and particularly 
their heads (see table 4).
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TABLE 3
the labour market in Greater Buenos aires, 1974-2010
(Percentages)
Oct-1974 Oct-1980 Oct-1986 Oct-1991 Oct-1996 Oct-2001 Q4-2003 Q4-2006 Q4-2010
Activity rate 49.1 48.3 49.0 49.7 53.8 52.8 57.7 57.8 56.6
Activity rate without job 
creation scheme beneficiaries
52.2 54.9 57.0 56.2
Employment rate 47.9 47.4 46.8 47.1 43.7 42.6 48.9 52.4 52.1
Employment rate without job 
creation scheme beneficiaries
42.1 46.0 51.5 51.6
Unemployment rate 2.4 2.2 4.5 5.3 18.8 19.3 15.5 9.7 8.0
Unemployment rate without job 
creation scheme beneficiaries
19.5 16.3 9.9 8.1
Informal jobs 37.7 38.0 42.0 47.0 46.9 48.6 55.3 51.2 42.1
Informal jobs without job 
creation scheme beneficiaries
47.9 52.5 50.4 41.6
Unregistered employeesa as 
share of all employees
19.0 17.1 21.1 30.0 33.3 33.5 39.1 36.4 28.1
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Permanent Household Survey (eph).
a  Excludes domestic service and job creation scheme beneficiaries.
TABLE 4
structure of households and family incomes in Greater Buenos aires, 1974-2010 
(Selected years)
Oct-1974 Oct-1986 Oct-1996 Q4-2003 Q4-2006 Q4-2010
Percentage of households
Households with heads aged under 30 11.7 9.8 9.9 9.9 9.6 8.6
Households with heads aged between 30 and 59 60.3 57.4 58.5 58.6 58.2 59.0
Households with heads aged over 59 28.0 32.8 31.5 31.6 32.2 32.5
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Percentage of population
Households with heads aged under 30 10.8 9.6 8.7 8.9 8.3 7.8
Households with heads aged between 30 and 59 68.5 67.7 69.1 68.5 67.9 68.0
Households with heads aged over 59 20.7 22.7 22.2 22.7 23.8 24.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Percentage of total family income from main occupation of family members
Households with heads aged under 30 91.6 88.2 83.9 83.3 77.8 83.6
Households with heads aged between 30 and 59 84.1 86.7 86.3 77.1 82.7 87.4
Households with heads aged over 59 41.4 40.8 36.0 46.3 43.2 45.0
Percentage of earnings contributed by head (main occupation)
Households with heads aged under 30 79.1 81.2 82.0 76.3 79.2 77.3
Households with heads aged between 30 and 59 77.1 77.6 75.7 74.4 68.6 68.3
Households with heads aged over 59 47.8 50.4 47.5 63.3 52.4 50.2
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Permanent Household Survey (eph).
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The first thing to highlight is the economic participation 
rate of this group. This is an indicator of willingness 
to work in a remunerated activity in the market, i.e., 
it is the sum of the employed and the unemployed 
relative to the total reference population, and its value 
will consequently tend to be greater in mid-life than 
at either end of the life cycle. For the universe taken 
here, consisting of household heads aged from 30 to 
59, this value can be expected to be very close to 100%. 
Any shortfall is the result of family decisions about 
which members are going to participate in economic 
activity, and of situations in which people are more 
or less motivated to seek a job because of the greater 
or lesser likelihood of obtaining one. Between 1974 
and 1996, there was a gradual reduction in inactivity 
among household heads, bringing their activity rate up 
from 91% to 94%, while from 2003 to 2010 the trend 
reversed and the rate fell from 96% to 92%, or held 
steady at about 91% if beneficiaries of job creation 
schemes are treated as spuriously active (see table 5). 
The reasons for this change are beyond the scope of 
this article, but suffice to say that it could be due to the 
drop in real household incomes in the first period and 
a degree of weakness in the demand for employment 
in the second. Support is given to this interpretation 
by the fact that the economic activity rate in the low 
class had risen to just 85% or so by 2010, whereas 
the figures were 92% in the middle class and 97% in 
the high class.
The trend of open unemployment provides a more 
detailed picture. Whereas in 1974 the unemployment 
rate among household heads was marginal (around 1%), 
this figure increased tenfold over the next two decades, 
rising to about 11% by 1996. This development was 
particularly felt in the low class, with unemployment 
rising from less than 3% in the mid-1970s to almost 
25%. If the seven-year period from 2003 to 2010 is 
taken, by contrast, it transpires that the unemployment 
rate was already back to single digits by 2003 and had 
fallen by about 50% by 2010 (it will be recalled that 
beneficiaries of job creation schemes are shifted from 
the unemployed to the employed category). The differing 
evolution of this indicator by social class should once 
again be noted. About 7% of household heads in the low 
class were actively seeking work, while the proportion 
of unemployed in the middle and high classes was about 
2.7% and 1.4%, respectively, in 2010.
Where employment quality is concerned, stress 
should be laid on the high level of informal working (own-
account workers, unregistered employees, domestic service 
and beneficiaries of job creation schemes) throughout the 
period; furthermore, this behaved procyclically relative 
to unemployment. The rate of informal employment rose 
from 27% to 35% between 1974 and 1996, while in the 
later phase, from 2003 to 2010, the combined share of 
all types of informal employment dropped from 46% to 
36%. Again, whereas growth in own-account working was 
the most dynamic component of informal employment 
between 1974 and 1986, the variable underlying the 
change in the share of informal working thereafter was 
the expansion of jobs not registered with the social 
security system. From the mid-1980s onward, there 
was little change in the employment shares of either 
own-account workers (ranging from 18% to 20%) or 
domestic service workers (ranging from about 3% to 
5%). In the expansionary period from 2003 to 2010, the 
reduction in informal working among household heads 
was due to the relative decline of unregistered jobs, 
own-account working and participation in job creation 
schemes, in that order.
In summary, the proportion of household heads 
working in formal employment (defined as registered 
wage employment) plus employers peaked in 1974 at 
63%, bottomed out in 2003 at 43.1% and then rose 
strongly again to 52.3% in 2010, although this was still 
below the mid-1970s level (see table 5).
The general pattern described was seen in all three 
social classes, but to differing degrees, with lack of 
convergence a notable characteristic. In the low class, 
just 30% of household heads had a formal job in 2010, 
whereas in the middle and high classes the figures were 
55% and 70%, respectively. In 1974, on the other hand, 
the figures had been 55%, 64% and 67% for the low, 
middle and high classes, respectively. The fall-off was 
sharpest in the low class, especially between 1986 and 
1996, when the share declined by over 20 percentage 
points, from 51% to 30%.
Between 2003 and 2010, the amount of formal 
employment was somewhat smaller, in relative terms, in 
the low class: whereas the gap for this indicator between 
the high and low classes was 35 points in 2003, by 2010 
it had widened to 39.5%. Something worth highlighting 
is that the degree of dispersion between classes for 
this indicator was much greater in 2010 than in 1974. 
The decline or expansion of unregistered employment, 
together with the evolution of unemployment, thus 
emerge as important determinants of changes in the 
social structure (see table 5). Nor can the existence of 
earnings gaps by occupational category and social class 
be overlooked (see table 6).
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TABLE 5
employment status of household heads aged between 30 and 59 in Greater Buenos 
aires, in total and by social class, 1974-2010
(Percentages)
Oct-1974 Oct-1986 Oct-1996 Q4-2003 Q4-2006 Q4-2010
All household heads
Employers 7.1 6.4 4.9 4.4 4.4 4.5
Own-account workers 18.0 20.7 18.1 20.1 19.3 17.6
Registered employees 55.9 52.0 42.7 38.7 41.8 47.8
Unregistered employees 6.3 6.8 13.9 17.6 17.2 13.2
Domestic service 2.7 3.6 3.2 3.7 5.6 4.6
Unemployed 1.1 3.1 10.9 6.7 3.9 3.6
Inactive 8.8 7.3 6.3 4.2 6.3 8.0
Job creation scheme beneficiaries 0 0 0 4.6 1.5 0.7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Low-class household heads
Employers 2.6 1.9 0.4 2.4 1.7 1.4
Own-account workers 13.8 18.0 14.4 20.0 21.0 20.5
Registered employees 52.6 49.4 30.1 21.5 25.4 29.3
Unregistered employees 8.5 9.8 16.6 21.0 22.4 20.0
Domestic service 5.9 4.7 4.5 3.8 8.1 6.5
Unemployed 2.6 7.4 24.6 13.1 7.6 7.0
Inactive 14.0 8.5 9.4 6.2 9.7 14.6
Job creation scheme beneficiaries 11.5 3.9 0.7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Middle-class household heads
Employers 6.4 3.8 2.0 2.9 2.3 3.9
Own-account workers 17.9 20.7 15.6 24.7 21.0 15.8
Registered employees 57.8 53.8 48.2 42.2 43.4 50.9
Unregistered employees 5.9 6.0 16.0 17.7 18.1 13.6
Domestic service 2.6 5.4 3.7 3.2 6.7 5.0
Unemployed 1.1 1.8 7.9 3.0 2.9 2.7
Inactive 8.3 8.5 6.7 4.6 5.0 6.8
Job creation scheme beneficiaries 1.6 0.6 1.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
High-class household heads
Employers 10.9 12.1 10.6 7.0 8.7 7.9
Own-account workers 20.9 22.7 22.8 17.2 16.3 16.5
Registered employees 55.8 52.1 48.2 51.9 55.7 62.4
Unregistered employees 5.4 5.5 10.4 14.4 11.8 6.6
Domestic service 0.8 1.1 1.7 3.8 2.4 2.5
Unemployed 0.1 1.3 2.6 3.3 1.2 1.4
Inactive 6.1 5.2 3.8 2.1 4.0 2.8
Job creation scheme beneficiaries
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Permanent Household Survey (eph).
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2.  the determinants of social class
The evidence just provided suggests that changes in 
the employment structure and in relative earnings have 
acted as determinants of social class in Argentina. One 
way of addressing this issue more precisely is to use 
multinomial logistic regression analysis. These models 
are a variation on conventional logit estimates and are 
appropriate when the dependent variable comprises 
more than two categories, in this case the three classes: 
low, middle and high (base category). The universe of 
analysis comprised household heads aged between 30 
and 59 (version 1) and the subset of employed people 
belonging to this group (version 2). The variables of 
interest were the status of household heads as employed 
and inactive versus unemployed (version 1) and the 
occupational categories of employer, registered employee, 
unregistered employee and domestic service worker versus 
that of own-account worker (version 2). The rest of the 
independent covariates were sex, age and age squared, 
educational level, household size and the number of 
working family members. Both versions of the model 
were estimated for 1974 and 2010 (see tables 7a and 7b). 
In version 1 of the model, controlling for the set of 
variables incorporated into it, the fact of the household 
head having been employed made membership of the low 
TABLE 6
relative earnings of household heads aged between 30 and 59 in Greater Buenos aires, 
1974-2010, in total and by social classa, b
(Percentages)
Oct-1974 Oct-1986 Oct-1996 Q4-2003 Q4-2006 Q4-2010
All household heads
Employers 158 232 237 188 188 168
Own-account workers 104 103 97 78 74 77
Registered employees 97 91 99 126 125 118
Unregistered employees 70 67 72 78 73 66
Domestic service 43 40 37 42 30 34
Low-class household heads
Employers 74 59 53 55 37 62
Own-account workers 59 46 35 35 36 39
Registered employees 71 53 52 67 73 76
Unregistered employees 54 44 37 43 49 46
Domestic service 37 34 30 29 22 19
Middle-class household heads
Employers 131 99 104 103 94 118
Own-account workers 95 80 72 59 63 74
Registered employees 89 72 72 92 104 103
Unregistered employees 64 61 59 72 69 68
Domestic service 44 39 34 46 31 42
High-class household heads
Employers 190 292 260 240 235 206
Own-account workers 133 156 139 139 129 124
Registered employees 123 136 141 165 160 147
Unregistered employees 93 103 126 122 117 117
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Permanent Household Survey (eph).
a  Average for each year = 100. 
b  Monthly earnings from the main occupation declared.
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class less likely. Conversely, the likelihood of forming 
part of the low class was not significantly different for 
inactive heads and unemployed heads. To a somewhat 
lesser degree, the same finding was obtained for the 
likelihood of belonging to the middle class (always 
relative to the high class). These two findings held good 
for both 1974 and 2010 (see table 7a). This highlights 
the fact that access to a job for the household head has 
historically been a powerful determinant of membership 
of the middle and high social classes.
With version 2, it is possible to go on to identify 
the effect of a particular occupational status. The model 
revealed that in 1974, being an unregistered worker was 
associated with a greater chance of belonging to the low 
class (see table 7b). To a lesser degree, close to the limit 
of statistical significance, a similar picture emerged for 
the likelihood of belonging to the middle class (relative 
to the high class). This finding confirms that there was 
an income penalty for employees in undeclared jobs, 
who were relegated to the lower social stratum. Again, 
the absence of a negative likelihood of belonging to the 
low class for employees in registered jobs reflects the 
fact that earnings differences between these and own-
account workers (the omitted category in the model) 
were not significant at the time. This is consistent with 
the existence of a “quasi-formal” type of own-account 
work that provided incomes similar to (and in some cases 
even higher than) those earned by registered workers.
TABLE 7A
estimates of the determinants of social class in Greater Buenos aires, 1974 and 2010
(Multinomial logistic regression models)
Universe: all household heads aged between 30 and 59
Oct-1974 Q4-2010
Dependent variable: low class
Independent variables Coefficient Standard error P>|z| Coefficient Standard error P>|z|
Male -1.551 0.260 0.000 -1.369 0.225 0.000
Age -0.155 0.109 0.155 -0.054 0.129 0.676
Age squared 0.001 0.001 0.263 0.000 0.001 0.767
Education: up to incomplete secondary -1.358 0.180 0.000 -2.160 0.521 0.000
Education: up to incomplete higher -3.583 0.309 0.000 -3.597 0.534 0.000
Education: complete higher -6.107 0.625 0.000 -5.885 0.596 0.000
Working -4.767 1.155 0.000 -3.417 0.526 0.000
Inactive -2.180 1.177 0.064 -1.000 0.640 0.118
Number of members in household 1.516 0.076 0.000 1.831 0.100 0.000
Number of working members in household -2.481 0.144 0.000 -2.354 0.161 0.000
Constant 7.868 2.646 0.003 6.131 2.818 0.030
Dependent variable: middle class
Independent variables Coefficient Standard error P>|z| Coefficient Standard error P>|z|
Male -0.617 0.194 0.001 -0.766 0.181 0.000
Age -0.044 0.082 0.593 -0.010 0.106 0.924
Age squared 0.000 0.001 0.685 0.000 0.001 0.943
Education: up to incomplete secondary -0.894 0.144 0.000 -1.616 0.484 0.001
Education: up to incomplete higher -1.746 0.191 0.000 -2.475 0.490 0.000
Education: complete higher -3.766 0.367 0.000 -3.561 0.507 0.000
Working -2.595 1.134 0.022 -1.490 0.519 0.004
Inactive -1.536 1.153 0.183 -0.260 0.628 0.679
Number of members in household 0.857 0.057 0.000 1.124 0.084 0.000
Number of working members in household -1.137 0.091 0.000 -1.159 0.129 0.000
Constant 3.938 2.142 0.066 3.082 2.367 0.193
Observations 1991 1479
Pseudo R2 0.255 0.335
Base variable: high class
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Permanent Household Survey (eph).
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In 2010, the situation changed and the fact of a 
household head working in a registered job reduced the 
likelihood of belonging to the low class, while being 
employed in a job that was not registered with the social 
security system did not increase it. This was because 
relative pay levels changed to such a degree that the fact 
of not having a registered job became a determinant of 
low class membership. The parameters estimated suggest 
both a widening of the earnings gap between registered 
and unregistered employees and a narrowing of the gap 
between the latter and own-account workers.
The evidence set out in the previous section 
documented an expansion of the unregistered workers 
segment in 2010 relative to the situation in the mid-1970s 
(see table 5). Similarly, a widening of the average pay 
gap between registered and unregistered employees had 
already taken place (see table 6). One way of ascertaining 
whether this outcome was due to occupational status 
TABLE 7B
estimates of the determinants of social class in Greater Buenos aires, 1974 and 2010
(Multinomial logistic regression models)
Universe: working household heads aged between 30 and 59
Oct-1974 Q4-2010
Dependent variable: low class
Independent variables Coefficient Standard error P>|z| Coefficient Standard error P>|z|
Male -1.184 0.336 0.000 -0.868 0.290 0.003
Age -0.161 0.123 0.192 -0.261 0.150 0.081
Age squared 0.001 0.001 0.302 0.003 0.002 0.101
Education: up to incomplete secondary -1.318 0.198 0.000 -1.844 0.596 0.002
Education: up to incomplete higher -3.481 0.336 0.000 -3.113 0.609 0.000
Education: complete higher -6.232 0.731 0.000 -5.601 0.692 0.000
Employer -1.326 0.425 0.002 -3.142 0.596 0.000
Registered employee 0.238 0.225 0.289 -2.301 0.288 0.000
Unregistered employee 1.421 0.370 0.000 0.429 0.365 0.239
Domestic service 3.422 0.592 0.000 0.733 0.507 0.148
Number of members in household 1.663 0.084 0.000 2.147 0.120 0.000
Number of working members in household -2.525 0.160 0.000 -2.787 0.192 0.000
Constant 2.156 2.633 0.413 7.176 3.238 0.027
Dependent variable: middle class
Independent variables Coefficient Standard error P>|z| Coefficient Standard error P>|z|
Male -0.267 0.236 0.258 -0.629 0.212 0.003
Age -0.057 0.087 0.513 -0.180 0.116 0.122
Age squared 0.001 0.001 0.581 0.002 0.001 0.138
Education: up to incomplete secondary -0.843 0.154 0.000 -1.738 0.538 0.001
Education: up to incomplete higher -1.722 0.202 0.000 -2.486 0.544 0.000
Education: complete higher -3.633 0.382 0.000 -3.683 0.562 0.000
Employer -0.573 0.256 0.025 -1.303 0.411 0.002
Registered employee 0.162 0.159 0.306 -0.735 0.228 0.001
Unregistered employee 0.602 0.280 0.032 0.577 0.320 0.072
Domestic service 1.830 0.531 0.001 0.363 0.453 0.424
Number of members in household 0.923 0.062 0.000 1.297 0.097 0.000
Number of working members in household -1.176 0.096 0.000 -1.333 0.143 0.000
Constant 0.969 1.892 0.609 5.549 2.532 0.028
Observations 1797 1306
Pseudo R2 0.2808 0.3814
Base variable: high class
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Permanent Household Survey (eph).
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or instead to other personal characteristics of wage 
earners is to estimate Mincerian earnings regressions 
(Mincer, 1974). Using least squares regression models 
to estimate individual earnings functions provides a 
way of ascertaining the average earnings difference 
between the formal (unregistered) and formal (registered) 
employees groups, after “controlling” for the effect of 
other characteristics of individuals and jobs usually 
considered to influence pay. The individual coefficients 
of the function correspond to different attributes that are 
included in the model specified and yield an earnings 
differential associated with that status. The dependent 
variable was the logarithm of the monthly wage and the 
independent variable of interest was employment in a 
job not registered with the social security system. Thus, 
the estimated parameter associated with this variable 
encapsulates a pay difference due to that attribute. The 
other covariates were educational level, sex, age, age 
squared, hours worked and sector of activity.
It can be seen that the penalty for holding an 
unregistered job doubled from 0.30 to 0.59 between 
1974 and 2010 (see table 8). This shows that the rise of 
informality in the structure of Argentine employment 
in the twenty-first century has been accompanied by an 
increase in wage segmentation. As already seen, this has 
also affected the social structure, as the type of job a 
person is able to obtain has become a factor influencing 
social class membership.
TABLE 8
estimates of wage determinants in Greater Buenos aires, 1974 and 2010a
(Ordinary least squares regression models)
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of wage Oct-1974 Q4-2010
Independent variables Coefficient Standard error P>|z| Coefficient Standard error P>|z|
Unregistered employee -0.303 0.045 0.000 -0.596 0.046 0.000
Age 0.025 0.016 0.115 0.050 0.023 0.032
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.114 -0.001 0.000 0.052
Male 0.467 0.044 0.000 0.240 0.046 0.000
Up to complete primary -0.406 0.046 0.000 -0.960 0.094 0.000
Up to incomplete secondary -0.221 0.044 0.000 -0.671 0.051 0.000
Up to incomplete tertiary 0.064 0.049 0.197 -0.461 0.048 0.000
Sector dummies Yes Yes
Hours 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.011 0.001 0.000
Constant 7.107 0.345 0.000 6.705 0.495 0.000
Observations 1724 922
R2 0.310 0.503
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Permanent Household Survey (eph).
a  Controlling for sample selection.
V
conclusions
The evolution of inequality in income distribution 
in Greater Buenos Aires between the mid-1970s and 
the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century 
hinted at far-reaching changes in the social structure. 
Meanwhile, measuring income polarization provided 
confirmation that the evolution of the middle class was 
one of the most prominent features of these changes. 
Another simultaneous development, furthermore, were 
large fluctuations in real per capita incomes throughout 
the period. This situation was confirmed by the different 
social stratification criteria used in the study.
Two starkly dissimilar stages emerge. Between 1974 
and 2001, the middle sections of society shrank rapidly 
and the low class expanded substantially. Between 2003 
and 2010, these trends were sharply reversed, but to 
differing degrees in the different social strata. The middle 
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and low classes, in that order, saw a strong recovery in 
incomes over those seven years, and this resulted in a 
sustained distributional improvement. Practically 8% of 
the population were absorbed in the ranks of the middle 
class as it expanded.
The recovery of the middle sections in Argentine 
society was unprecedented since at least the mid-1970s. It 
is worth emphasizing that it was the result both of upward 
social mobility (the shrinking of the low class) and of the 
contraction of the high class. These developments imply 
that income redistribution mechanisms were at work, 
increasing the resources of those in the low and middle 
segments of the social structure but without producing 
a shift on a similar scale at the top.
These mechanisms do not seem to have operated in 
isolation from the workings of the labour market. The 
decline in unemployment and informal working, especially 
in the unregistered wage employment category, stands 
out as the main factor behind the fluctuating movements 
in the social classes in the long period under analysis. 
Thus, when the characteristics of occupational status 
were examined (from a stratification perspective that 
drew particularly on the tradition of sociology), it was 
possible to ascertain that there had been an increase in 
the number of jobs providing greater stability to those 
holding them. This partially reversed the strong increase 
in occupational instability that had characterized the 
last quarter of the twentieth century. It should also be 
considered that this improvement in job quality went 
together with more vigorous collective bargaining 
between workers and employers and periodic increases 
in the minimum wage, among other factors. These 
mechanisms tend to compress the pay distribution, as 
their greatest effects are at the lower end of the income 
scale. The application of lump-sum pay increases for 
all workers will have operated in the same direction, as 
will various social protection measures implemented 
in the period, with job creation schemes, expanded 
coverage of pension benefits and the extension of family 
allowances to the children of informal workers being 
among the most important.
Besides the overall improvement in the dynamics 
of the social structure, this study also revealed the 
persistence of labour market segmentation. In other 
words, those who succeeded in obtaining a registered 
job enjoyed a pay advantage over employees in jobs 
that were not registered with the social security system. 
Likewise, access to a formal job remained elusive for a 
quite considerable proportion of individuals in the lowest 
social stratum. This being the case, it is not surprising that 
the type of employment obtained should have resulted 
in social differentiation persisting at increasingly high 
levels over the long period from 1974 to 2010. In other 
words, it was possible to ascertain that the wage gap 
between registered and unregistered workers (and the 
widening of this gap), together with the high proportion 
of employment accounted for by the latter, influenced 
households’ membership of a particular social class.
Taken together, all this evidence confirms the 
urgent need for efforts to reduce the level of undeclared 
employment in the Argentine economy. It seems unlikely 
that higher levels of social integration can be achieved 
unless obstacles to registered employment are removed. It 
should be recalled that the wage penalty for unregistered 
wage workers doubled between 1974 and 2010, and 
has not fallen in the new century so far. Efforts should 
at least begin in certain sectors where the level of non-
registration is very high, prime examples being retail, 
construction, the textile and apparel industry and domestic 
service. In the meantime, it is necessary to enhance and 
extend the implementation of different social protection 
measures aimed at reducing the earnings gap between 
those who obtain a formal job and those who remain 
trapped in informality.
Lastly, it is worth emphasizing the potential for new 
research that incorporates methodological contributions 
from economics and sociology in the examination of 
changes in the social structure. The present study is an 
effort in this direction. By using different indicators and 
criteria drawn from the two disciplines to demarcate 
social groups, it was possible to establish certain links 
between distributional shifts, certain prominent features 
of the labour market and membership of a social class. 
Continued work along this line of analysis would probably 
yield detailed knowledge of the vicissitudes of social 
structures in the twenty-first century.
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